Jordan v. Gardner:  Female Prisoners\u27 Rights to be Free from Random, Cross-Gender Clothed Body Searches by Stollman, David J.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 62 Issue 6 Article 11 
1994 
Jordan v. Gardner: Female Prisoners' Rights to be Free from 
Random, Cross-Gender Clothed Body Searches 
David J. Stollman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David J. Stollman, Jordan v. Gardner: Female Prisoners' Rights to be Free from Random, Cross-Gender 
Clothed Body Searches, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1877 (1994). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol62/iss6/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
COMMENT
JORDAN v. GARDNER: FEMALE PRISONERS' RIGHTS TO BE
FREE FROM RANDOM, CROSS-GENDER CLOTHED
BODY SEARCHES
DAVID J STOLLMAN
INTRODUCTION
On July 5, 1989, a male guard at the Washington Corrections Center
for Women ("WCCW") randomly stopped a female prisoner and per-
formed a clothed body search.' The guard ran his hands over her entire
body, from neck to feet.2 He squeezed and kneaded her breasts and
probed her crotch by pushing inward and upward with the flat of his
hand.3 Moreover, the guard squeezed and kneaded any seams in her
crotch area.4 During the search, the female inmate, distressed and
shocked, grabbed hold of some nearby cell bars.5 After the search, her
fingers had to be pried loose from the bars.6 Soon after, she returned to
her cell and vomited.7
That day, the WCCW inmates filed a complaint in federal district
court and obtained a preliminary injunction prohibiting male guards
from performing random, clothed body searches on female prisoners.'
The court concluded that the cross-gender clothed body search policy
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.'
The district court's decision was unique in two respects. First, in al-
most all previous cross-gender prison search cases, courts had applied a
Fourth Amendment analysis.' 0 Second, the court was the first to con-
1. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
2. See id
3. See id
4. See id
5. See id
6. See id
7. See id.
8. See id
9. See Jordan v. Gardner, No. C89-339TB (W.D. Wash. Feb. 28, 1990).
10. See e.g., Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1992) (employing a
Fourth Amendment analysis); Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 916 (6th Cir. 1992)
(determining that a Fourth Amendment analysis should be considered); Cookish v. Pow-
ell, 945 F.2d 441, 446 (Ist Cir. 1991) (reaching a conclusion based on a Fourth Amend-
ment analysis); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that
incarcerated prisoners retain a limited right of bodily privacy); Smith v. Chrans, 629 F.
Supp. 606, 610 (C.D. Ill. 1986) (employing a Fourth Amendment analysis).
Inmates also bring First Amendment claims in prison search cases when the inmate
has a religious objection to intimate contact by a guard of another sex. See generally
Sam'I v. Mintzes, 554 F. Supp. 416, 417 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (analyzing a muslim pris-
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elude that random, cross-gender clothed body prison searches violate the
Eighth Amendment.
Prison officials appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, where a three-judge panel reversed the district court's de-
cision.1 Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit granted an en banc rehearing
of the case and vacated the previous appellate decision.' 2
In deciding the en banc hearing, the majority in this case, Jordan v.
Gardner, concluded that the district court had decided correctly that the
prison's policy violated the Eighth Amendment.' I3 Two judges concurred
that the prison policy violated the Eighth Amendment, but they sup-
ported deciding the case on Fourth Amendment grounds.' 4 Two judges
filed dissenting opinions, both maintaining that the WCCW search policy
did not violate either the Fourth or Eighth Amendment.I5
This Note addresses two issues raised in Gardner: first, whether the
cross-gender clothed body search in Gardner violated the Eighth Amend-
ment; 16 and second, whether the cross-gender clothed body search in
Gardner violated the Fourth Amendment. 7
This discussion proceeds in five parts. Part I outlines the Eighth
Amendment and Fourth Amendment law applicable to Gardner.8 Part
II presents the facts of Gardner.9 Part III explains the reasoning behind
the Gardner decision's five opinions.20 Part IV criticizes the majority's
Eighth Amendment analysis.2 ' Part V proposes an alternative way to
oner's allegation that submitting to a pat-down search by a female guard was a violation
of his constitutional right to free exercise of religion).
One court has concluded that a cross-gender search violated an inmate's Eighth
Amendment rights. See Lee v. Downs, 470 F. Supp. 188, 193 (E.D. Va. 1979) (determin-
ing that a female prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights had been violated), aff'd, 641 F.2d
1117 (4th Cir. 1981) (upholding the lower court's holding but referring only to an inva-
sion of privacy, not an Eighth Amendment violation). Unlike the searches in Gardner,
Downs entailed a forcible removal of a female inmate's clothes by male guards. See id.
Another court has concluded that cross-gender body cavity searches violate the Eighth
Amendment. See Frazier v. Ward, 426 F. Supp. 1354, 1366 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
11. See Jordon v. Gardner, 953 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1992).
12. See Jordan v. Gardner, 968 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1992) (granting rehearing en banc).
13. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1525 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Circuit
Judges Poole, Hall, and Leavy joined in the majority opinion. See id. at 1521-22. Both
Judge Reinhardt's opinion, which Judge Canby joined, and Judge Noonan's opinion are
concurrences in result. Thus, the majority mustered seven votes.
14. See id. at 1532 (Reinhardt, J. and Noonan, J., concurring). Judge Noonan's con-
currence agreed with the majority's reasoning and discussed how indecent and cruel
cross-gender searches are. See id. at 1543 (Noonan, J., concurring).
15. See id. at 1545-66 (Trott, J., dissenting) & 1566-67 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
Judge Trott was joined in full by Kleinfeld and Wiggins and joined in part by Chief Judge
Wallace. See id. at 1545.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 223-65.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 266-95.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 23-96.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 97-122.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 123-222.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 223-65.
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analyze Gardner.' This Note concludes that courts should apply a
Fourth Amendment analysis, instead of an Eighth Amendment analysis,
to cases similar to Gardner.
I. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND FOURTH AMENDMNNT LAW
RELEVANT To GARDNER
Unlike free citizens, prisoners are not entitled to the Constitution's full
protection.23 The Supreme Court has declared that "imprisonment car-
ries with it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights." 24 The
Supreme Court has also made clear, however, that prisons are "not be-
yond the reach of the Constitution."25 Thus, prisoners are accorded
"those rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or
incompatible with the objectives of incarceration. '26
A. Prisoner's Constitutional Rights
The Supreme Court has recognized that prisoners retain limited First
Amendment,27 Equal Protection,2 8 and Due Process rights.2 9  The
Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether a prisoner has any
Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches of his
person.3" The Supreme Court has, however, recently determined that
prisoners have no Fourth Amendment protection from searches of their
property within their prison cells. This conclusion indicates that if pris-
oners have any Fourth Amendment rights whatsoever, they are ex-
tremely limited.3  In addition to these limited rights, upon
imprisonment, individuals gain the protection of the Eighth
22. See infra text accompanying notes 266-305.
23. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1984).
24. IM. at 524 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)).
25. Iti at 523.
26. Id. Further, the Supreme Court has stated that "[loss of freedom of choice and
privacy are inherent incidents of confinement.. . ." Bell, 441 U.S. at 537.
27. See Pelf v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); see also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S.
319, 322 (1972) (per curiam) (determining that prisoners must be provided reasonable
opportunities to exercise their religious freedom).
28. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam).
29. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519
(1972).
30. The Court in Bell v. Wolfish assumed, but did not decide, that inmates retain
some Fourth Amendment rights; nonetheless, it concluded that, in any event, the chal-
lenged searches were reasonable. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 558.
31. See Hudson v. Palmer, 486 U.S. 517, 530 (1984). There, the Supreme Court held
that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy within their prison cells. Thus, a
prisoner's private property in his cell is not protected from random searches under the
Fourth Amendment. See id at 529-30. Further, while the Supreme Court did not di-
rectly address the issue of whether a prisoner has any Fourth Amendment rights to pri-
vacy, the Court did conclude that body-cavity searches are not unreasonable; they do not
violate the Fourth Amendment. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558. This decision hints at the
extremely limited Fourth Amendment protection the Supreme Court would provide.
The Court in Palmer cautioned, however, "that prison attendants can[not] ride rough-
shod over inmates' property rights with impunity." Palmer, 468 U.S. at 530. The Court
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Amendment.32
B. The Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment protects incarcerated persons from cruel and
unusual punishment. The amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted.",3' The Supreme Court has determined that "[a]fter in-
carceration, only the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,'
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment."34 In analyzing an Eighth Amendment claim, a court
must examine two factors." First, it must consider whether there is a
sufficient "infliction of pain" to constitute a violation.36 Second, it must
determine whether the infliction is "unnecessary and wanton."'37
In addressing the first factor, the Supreme Court has stated that no
single test can determine whether conditions of confinement are cruel
and unusual.38 Rather, in determining whether an infliction of pain was
overly severe, a court must consider" 'the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.' 3
Although the Supreme Court did not create a specific test for deter-
mining what degree of pain the Eighth Amendment prohibits, the Court
provided one specific guideline-courts should analyze Eighth Amend-
ment claims by examining objective factors.4" Thus, courts must objec-
tively determine whether an infliction of pain is cruel and unusual under
society's contemporary standards of decency.4"
To evaluate the second factor-whether an infliction of pain is "wan-
ton"-a court must inquire into an official's state of mind.42 In making
this subjective inquiry, a court must give "due regard for differences in
the kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment objection is
lodged."
4 3
Because wantonness depends on the type of conduct involved, the
Supreme Court has not adopted a single standard for assessing "wanton-
ness." Rather, the Court has established two culpability standards:
suggested that a prisoner's redress could be an Eighth Amendment claim, a state law
claim or an administrative grievance. See id.
32. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976) (citing cases that have de-
scribed the protection the Eighth Amendment affords to prisoners).
33. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
34. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103)
(internal citations omitted).
35. See Wilson v. Seiter, l11 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991).
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).
39. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
40. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980).
41. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346-47.
42. See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991).
43. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986).
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whether a prison official acted with "deliberate indifference"" (the "de-
liberate indifference standard"); and whether a prison official acted
"'maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm'"
(the "malice standard").4" These standards apply in different
circumstances.
The Supreme Court first articulated the deliberate-indifference stan-
dard in Estelle v. Gamble.' In Estelle, a bale of cotton fell on a prisoner
while he was unloading a truck during the course of prison work.47 The
prisoner brought an Eighth Amendment action, claiming that prison offi-
cials gave him inadequate medical treatment after the injury.4s The
Court held that the prison officials' deliberate indifference to the pris-
oner's medical needs constituted cruel and unusual punishment that vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment.49 In a later case, the Supreme Court
explained that the deliberate-indifference standard was appropriate in Es-
telle because "the State's responsibility to attend to the medical needs of
prisoners does not ordinarily clash with other equally important govern-
mental responsibilities."50
In Wilson v. Seiter,1 the Court broadened the Estelle holding.,2 In
Wilson, an inmate alleged that the prison's overcrowding, unsanitary din-
ing facilities and food preparation, improper ventilation, and inadequate
heating and cooling constituted cruel and usual punishment in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. 3 The Court emphasized that characterizing
conduct as "wanton" depends upon the constraints an official faces.'
The Court reasoned that the prison officials who made decisions about
these nonmedical conditions faced constraints that were similar to the
constraints that officials face when making decisions about medical con-
ditions.55 Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that courts should use the
same standard to analyze claims alleging inadequate conditions of con-
finement and claims alleging inadequate medical care.56 To aid courts in
implementing the deliberate-indifference standard, the Court explained
that a "condition of confinement" that a prisoner endures includes but is
44. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
45. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d
Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
46. See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 97.
47. See id at 99.
48. See id at 99-101.
49. See id at 104. The Court defined deliberate indifference as being more than negli-
gent conduct. See id at 105-06. The Court also determined that the inmate's claims
against the prison's medical director were invalid. See id. at 107-08. The Court, how-
ever, remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the prisoner had
stated a cause of action against other prison officials. See id. at 108.
50. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986).
51. 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
52. See id. at 2326.
53. See id at 2323.
54. See id at 2326.
55. See id. at 2327.
56. See id at 2326.
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not limited to "the food he is fed, the clothes he is issued, the tempera-
ture he is subjected to in his cell, and the protection he is afforded against
other inmates.""7
Following this pronouncement, courts have applied the deliberate-in-
difference standard in a variety of circumstances. They have applied it in
cases involving medical treatment,"' prison health conditions, 9 and a
prisoner's safety from other prisoners.6
In Whitley v. Albers, the Supreme Court outlined the second stan-
dard-the malice standard-to determine whether a prison official's con-
duct was wanton. 61 This standard applies when a prison official makes
and carries out "decisions involving the use of force to restore order in
the face of a prison disturbance. ' 61 In such cases, the standard is
"whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm."63
Two factors justified a different standard for cases involving prison dis-
turbances. First, because of the potential danger of harm during a prison
disturbance, prison administrators' duty to ensure the safety of the prison
staff, administrative personnel and visitors, and the inmates themselves
substantially increases.' Second, prison officials make these decisions
"in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second
chance." '65
57. Id. at 2326-27.
58. See, e.g., Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1991) (deciding that
"the Eighth Amendment also protects against deliberate indifference to an inmate's seri-
ous mental health and safety needs"); LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 394 (4th Cir. 1987)
(concluding that a paraplegic prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights were violated when
the warden acted with deliberate indifference to his conditions of confinement).
Further, in Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1207 (8th Cir. 1990), the court con-
cluded that a prison official violated an inmate's Eighth Amendment rights by compelling
the inmate to work beyond his physical capacity.
59. See, e.g., Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 449 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding that
inmate had to show that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to cell conditions to
prevail on an Eight Amendment claim); Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir.
1991) (determining that an Eighth Amendment violation requires deliberate indifference
to prison conditions on the part of prison officials).
60. See, e.g., Bailey v. Wood, 909 F.2d 1197 (8th Cir. 1990) (determining that a pris-
oner must show that prison warden acted with "deliberate indifference" when he failed to
prevent violent attacks by another inmate); Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 218 (7th Cir.
1990) (concluding that the Eighth Amendment rights of an inmate are violated by a
prison official who with "deliberate indifference," fails to protect an inmate from attacks);
Walsh v. Mellas, 837 F.2d 789 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061 (1988) (determining
that officials acted with "deliberate indifference" by failing to screen cell-mates for in-
mates whom they knew risk of assault was a serious problem).
61. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986).
62. Id. at 320.
63. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1033 (1973)).
64. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320.
65. Id.
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In Hudson v. McMillian,66 the Supreme Court expanded the malice
standard's application.67 In McMillian, a prison inmate alleged that his
Eighth Amendment rights had been violated when a prison guard, with-
out cause, beat him excessively, loosening his teeth and cracking his par-
tial dental plate." Because many of the concerns underlying the malice
standard arise whenever guards use force, the Court held that the malice
standard applies to all cases in which a prisoner accuses a guard of using
excessive physical force.69
The issue of which standard courts should apply when faced with an
alleged unconstitutional, random, cross-gender clothed body search is
both problematic and significant. If a court determines that random,
cross-gender clothed body searches are a condition of confinement, then
it must use the lower deliberate-indifference standard. On the other
hand, if a court determines that such searches involve excessive physical
force or are a response to a prison disturbance, then it must apply the
higher malice standard. This issue arose in Gardner, where the majority
used the deliberate-indifference standard and the dissent used the malice
standard.7'
C. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures."'"
In cases that do not involve prisoners, determining whether a search of
an individual violates the Fourth Amendment requires a two-step analy-
sis. First, a court must decide whether a person has a "constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy."72 This determination re-
quires a court to make two inquiries: whether the individual has exhib-
ited a subjective expectation of privacy and whether society recognizes
that expectation as reasonable.7 3 If a court finds that the individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy, a court must then proceed to the sec-
ond step of the Fourth Amendment analysis: determining whether the
governmental action is constitutional. 4 To make this determination, a
court must decide whether, in the particular context, the interests as-
serted by the state actors are reasonable when balanced against the in-
66. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
67. See id at 998-99.
68. See id at 997.
69. See id at 999.
70. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1528, 1558 (Trott, J., dissenting) (9th Cir.
1993).
71. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
72. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also
Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1992) (implementing the Katz inquiry as the
first step in its Fourth Amendment analysis).
73. See Covino, 967 F.2d at 77; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
74. See Covino, 967 F.2d at 78.
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mate's privacy expectations.7"
Because prisoners have limited constitutional rights, however, courts
do not apply this analysis to prisoner's Fourth Amendment claims. In-
stead, courts analyze a prisoner's Fourth Amendment claims by using
the approach mandated in Turner v. Safley.76 In Turner, prisoners
brought a class action suit to determine the constitutionality of two
prison regulations." The first regulation limited correspondence be-
tween inmates at different institutions, and the second regulation permit-
ted inmates to marry only with the superintendent's permission." The
Supreme Court upheld the correspondence regulation but struck down
the marriage restriction.79
In arriving at these conclusions, the Turner Court established the stan-
dard of review for prison cases: "when a prison regulation impinges on
inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.""s The Court stated that such
a standard is necessary to permit prison administrators, rather than
courts, to make difficult judgments concerning prison operations."' The
Court made clear that it did not want prison officials' day-to-day judg-
ments subjected to an inflexible strict-scrutiny analysis because such an
analysis would hamper an administrator's decision-making process.8 2
In analyzing Fourth Amendment claims under a Turner analysis,
courts logically have preceded it with an additional inquiry: whether
prisoners possess any Fourth Amendment rights.8 3 This inquiry is neces-
sary because the Supreme Court has not decided whether prisoners have
Fourth Amendment rights, and the Turner standard applies only when
75. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66
(1989).
76. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
77. See id. at 81-82.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 99-100.
80. Id. at 89. The court in Turner adopted this standard of review in order to recon-
cile the principle that inmates retain at least some constitutional rights despite incarcera-
tion. The Court recognized that prison officials are best able to make decisions regarding
prison administration. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223-24 (1990).
Although the Turner case involved inmates' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights,
the Turner standard has also been applied to prisoners' Fourth Amendment rights. See,
e.g., Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying the Turner test);
Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 916-17 (6th Cir. 1992) (explicating the Turner test);
Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying the Turner test).
Turner, however, does not apply to Eighth Amendment cases. See Jordan v. Gardner,
986 F.2d 1521, 1535 n.8. (9th Cir. 1993).
81. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., Covino, 967 F.2d at 78 (performing this inquiry before conducting a
Turner analysis); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1988) (same);
Smith v. Chrans, 629 F. Supp. 606, 610-11 (C.D. Ill. 1986) (determining whether prison-
ers retain some limited Fourth Amendment protection before performing a Fourth
Amendment analysis).
[Vol. 621884
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"a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights."'  Thus,
if prisoners have no Fourth Amendment rights, Turner does not apply to
prisoners' Fourth Amendment claims. Those circuit courts that have
considered whether inmates have Fourth Amendment rights have con-
cluded that inmates retain some limited Fourth Amendment
protection. 5
Further, several courts have considered the more narrow issue of
whether inmates possess Fourth Amendment rights that "could be in-
fringed by the cross-gender aspect of otherwise constitutional
searches."" 6 Courts have examined the cross-gender issue in a variety of
circumstances. Several courts have determined that clothed body
searches that do not include touching of the genitalia and buttocks do
not violate the Constitution."' Other courts have concluded that clothed
body searches that include this touching do not violate the Constitu-
tion. 8 Courts have also addressed whether the Fourth Amendment pro-
hibits guards of one sex from seeing partially or totally nude prisoners of
the opposite sex. Courts have addressed the issue in different contexts,
including showering and dressing, and have arrived at different
conclusions.8 9
Assuming arguendo that a prisoner has some Fourth Amendment
84. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
85. See e.g., Covino, 967 F.2d at 78 (concluding that inmates do retain a limited right
to bodily privacy); Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 916 (6th Cir. 1992) (explaining
that a convicted prisoner maintains some reasonable expectations of privacy while in
prison); Cookish v. Powell, 945 F.2d 441, 446 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that some Fourth
Amendment protection was available to inmates as to their persons); Michenfelder, 860
F.2d at 333 (recognizing that incarcerated prisoners retain a limited right of bodily pri-
vacy); Smith, 629 F. Supp. at 610-11 (C.D. Ill. 1986) (determining that a prisoner retains
some limited Fourth Amendment protection). But see Bagley v. Watson, 579 F. Supp.
1099, 1103 (D. Or. 1983) (concluding that prisoners have no federal constitutional rights
to freedom from clothed "pat-down" frisk searches and/or visual observations in states of
undress performed by female correctional officer guards); Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d
491, 495-96 (9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that the search was reasonable, and thus, not
deciding whether the prisoner has these rights).
86. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1993).
87. See, eg., Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 957 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
996 (1983) (permitting searches of males by female guards, even where there might be
incidental contact with the genital area); Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 55 (7th Cir.
1982) (determining that the search does not infringe upon any constitutional guaranteed
right).
88. See, eg., Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1985) (allowing rou-
tine pat searches of male inmates by female guards where the pat search included probing
of the groin area); Bagley, 579 F. Supp. at 1104-05 (upholding cross-gender searches by
female guards that included a search of both the genital and buttock areas).
89. Some courts have held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits guards from view-
ing partially nude or totally nude prisoners of the opposite sex. See. eg., Cumbey v.
Meachum, 684 F.2d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1982) (concluding that female guards viewing of
nude male prisoners does not necessarily fall short of a cognizable constitutional claim);
Bowling v. Enomoto, 514 F. Supp. 201, 204 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (recognizing that prisoner's
have a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unrestricted observation of private areas
by prison officials of the opposite sex under normal prison conditions); Hudson v. Good-
lander, 494 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D. Md. 1980) (holding that an inmate's rights were vio-
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rights, a court must then apply the Turner standard and determine
whether a prison regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate peno-
logical interest.90 The Turner court identified four factors governing the
review of prison regulations:91 first, whether there is a "'valid, rational
connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmen-
tal interest put forward to justify it";92 second, whether there are "alter-
native means of exercising the right that remain open to prison
inmates"; 93 third, what impact accommodating "the asserted constitu-
tional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation
of prison resources generally"; 94 and fourth, whether there are ready al-
ternatives available to the prison authorities. 95 In discussing the fourth
factor, the Court emphasized that the existence of an "obvious, easy al-
ternative" that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis
cost to valid penological interests would indicate that a regulation does
not satisfy the reasonable-relationship standard. 96
II. JORDAN v GARDNER: BACKGROUND
The Gardner case arose from prison policies imposed at the Washing-
ton Corrections Center for Women. The WCCW, an all-female prison,
imprisons minimum, medium, and maximum security convicted felons. 97
In December 1989, the prison housed 270 inmates. 98 Since its inception,
the WCCW has employed both male and female guards.99
To ensure prison security, prison regulations permitted guards to per-
form "suspicionless searches."" Before mid-1989, only female guards
performed suspicionless searches of prisoners, and they conducted these
lated by the assignment of female guards to posts where they could view him while he
was completely or entirely unclothed).
Courts have also reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Michenfelder v. Sumner,
860 F.2d 328, 334 (9th Cir. 1988) (determining that female guards viewing strip searches
of male prisoners did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation where female officers
were not routinely present); Johnson v. Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections, 661 F. Supp.
425, 435 (W.D. Pa 1987) (concluding that no constitutional violation occurred when fe-
male guards viewed naked male prisoners); Smith v. Chrans, 629 F. Supp 606, 612 (C.D.
Ill. 1986) (determining that inadvertent and occasional sightings of naked males by fe-
male guards do not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation); Grummett, 779 F.2d at
496 (concluding that allowing female correctional officers to view prisoners in states of
undress or total nudity does not violate the Fourth amendment).
90. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987).
91. See id.
92. Id. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
93. Id. at 90.
94. Id. The Court emphasized that courts should be particularly deferential to prison
officials' informed decisions when accommodation of an asserted right will have a signifi-
cant "ripple effect." See id.
95. See id. at 90.
96. See id. at 91.
97. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1993).
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. Id.
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searches only at fixed checkpoints.' Male guards performed searches
only in emergency situations.102 The WCCW prison policies did not in-
clude any random searches.' 0 3
A. The Origins of the Case
The Gardner case arose out of two events. First, in 1988, female
guards filed a grievance against a prison policy that required them to
perform all routine searches at the prison." 4 These guards complained
that their meal breaks, taken while they were still officially on duty, were
occasionally interrupted to conduct searches at fixed points.' 05 The
Washington Department of Corrections denied the grievance. 0 6
Second, in January 1989, Eldon Vail became the new WCCW Superin-
tendent. I 7 Because Vail believed that the fixed checkpoints were ineffec-
tive in controlling the movement of contraband in the prison, he
instituted a random-search policy. 08 On February 26, 1989, Vail insti-
tuted another new policy that permitted male guards to conduct random
searches of clothed inmates."° The policy took effect on July 5, 1989.110
The circuit judges disputed the reasons why Vail implemented this sec-
ond policy. The majority opinion emphasized that the policy was a reac-
tion to threatened legal action by the guards' union."I' The union
threatened to bring a sex discrimination suit to eliminate the inequality
101. See id
102. See id The WCCW prison regulations expressly stated that "suspicionless
searches" were to be conducted by female guards only. See id. at 1532 (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring). Male guards were permitted to conduct "suspicion searches"-a fully
clothed body search performed when there was reason to suspect that a prisoner was
carrying contraband or if there was an emergency. See id. In practice, however, "suspi-
cion searches" were always conducted by female guards. See id.
103. See id at 1523.
104. See id
105. See id.
106. See id
107. See id.
108. See id. Superintendent Vail took over his job "in the shadow of an escape and
with a mandate to tighten security.. . ." Id at 1553 (Trott, J., dissenting).
The necessity for a random search policy was supplied by Vail's trial testimony:
From my experience, the ability for a correctional officer to conduct a pat
search is a fundamental part of his or her job, and in most institutions or in
other facilities that I had been in, what I had witnessed was that taking place.
Inmates knew it and staff knew it, that searches of the clothed body can occur
any place, any time when an officer decides that it needs to occur. That creates
the unpredictable element in inmate movement throughout the institution so
that inmates always have to be on guard a bit about packing contraband. That
there's always at least a slim chance that someone will ask to search them. And
overall, that was--that was and is the security issue that we've tried to
implement.
Id at 1548 (Trott, J., dissenting).
109. See id. at 1523.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 1529.
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between male and female guards. 112 The dissent emphasized the security
objectives Superintendent Vail hoped to achieve through the cross-gen-
der searches.113 Both the dissent and Vail contended that random
searches performed only by female guards would be less effective than
random cross-gender searches, because, if only female guards could per-
form the searches, prisoners would exploit the fact that male guards
could not search them.114 Vail asserted that if an inmate knew that there
were only male guards in one area of the prison, then that inmate could
freely move contraband through that area." Thus, Vail testified that he
implemented cross-gender random searches in order to create an unpre-
dictable element within the institution "so that inmates always ha[d] to
be on guard a bit about packing contraband."'"1
6
B. The WCCW Cross-Gender Clothed Body Search
In conducting a cross-gender clothed body search, a guard runs his
hands thoroughly over the inmate's clothed body, starting with the in-
mate's neck and working down to the feet. 1 7 The prison's training
materials state that to conduct a proper search a guard must:
'Squeeze and knead the shoulders .... Knead ... the inside of the
waistband of trousers [and] pull[ ] the fly away from the body. From
behind, . . . [use] both hands across the crotch[,] [p]ushing the hands
across the crotch[,] ... [s]queezing and kneading all seams .... The
breast area shall be searched in a sweeping motion, using only the back
of the hand .... The breasts of a female will be flattened by this
method. Use a flat hand and a pushing motion across the crotch area.
Maintain a flat, inward pushing motion. The edge of the hand in a
downward motion can be used to check the crease in the buttocks.
Push inward and upward when searching the crotch and upper thighs
of the inmate."' 8
Thus, while cross-gender clothed body searches are euphemistically
called "pat-down" searches, 19 the searches involve far more than simply
patting an inmate's body.
112. See id. at 1553, 1555 (Trott, J., dissenting).
113. See id. at 1547-48 (Trott, J., dissenting).
114. See id. at 1548 (Trott, J., dissenting).
115. See id. at 1554 (Trott, J., dissenting). Vail testified at trial that "[o]n numerous
occasions, I have only men, for example, in a living unit on a particular shift, two males
at the same time. If you want to move some contraband in the direction, you know now
is the time." Id.
116. Id. at 1548 (Trott, J., dissenting).
117. See id. at 1523.
118. Id. at 1533 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
119. Both District Court Judge Bryan and Court of Appeals Judge O'Scannlain, writ-
ing for the majority, make clear that the term "pat-down" search is misleading. See id. at
1522 n.1. These searches involved not "'patting' but rather motions that are more accu-
rately described as 'rubbing,' 'squeezing,' and 'kneading.' We ... decline to refer to the
searches as 'pat-down' searches in favor of the neutral description 'cross-gender clothed
body' searches." Id.
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C. Introduction of Random, Cross-Gender Clothed Body Searches to
the WCCW
On July 5, 1989, male guards began performing these searches on fe-
male inmates. During the day, guards searched several inmates; one in-
mate apparently suffered tremendous anguish. This prisoner, after
submitting to the search, "had to have her fingers pried loose from the
bars she had grabbed during the search, and she vomited after returning
to her cell block.""12 That same day, the inmates filed a complaint in
federal district court and obtained a preliminary injunction against male
guards performing random, cross-gender searches on female prisoners. t2
After a six day trial, the court concluded that the cross-gender clothed
body search violated inmates' First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendment
rights.12 2 After a complicated appeals process, the United States Court
of Appeals heard the case en banc and, subsequently, issued a plurality
opinion.
III. JORDAN V. GARDNER: THE OPINIONS
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, decided on Eighth Amendment grounds, begins
by clarifying its reasons for not deciding the case on Fourth Amendment
grounds.123 The majority did not employ a Fourth Amendment analysis
for two reasons. First, courts have not yet recognized that the Fourth
Amendment protects inmates from cross-gender clothed body
searches.124 Courts, however, have established that the Eighth Amend-
120. Id. at 1523.
121. See id at 1523. After the first day of implementing the cross.gender search pol-
icy, the prison informally agreed to suspend the searches. Two days later, when Vail
decided to reinstitute the searches, the inmates obtained the temporary restraining order.
See id. at 1534 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
122. See id at 1522-24. The case was then appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals, where a three-judge panel reversed the district court's decision. See 953 F.2d
1137. Subsequently, the appellate decision was vacated when an en banc rehearing of the
case was granted. See 968 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g en banc granted.
123. See id. at 1524. The inmates also claimed that the random, cross-gender searches
violated their First Amendment rights. See id. at 1524 n.3. The court addressed the
inmates' Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims before their First Amend-
ment claims because the Fourth and Eighth Amendments "more directly regulate the
conduct at issue-searching, and inflicting pain and suffering-and affect a much larger
part of the inmate population." Id.
A female inmate usually brings First Amendment claims in prison search cases when
she has some religious objection to intimate contact by men not her husband. Men have
also brought First Amendment claims in prison search cases employing similar reason-
ing. See generally Sam'I v. Mintzes, 554 F. Supp. 416, 417 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (analyzing
a male prisoner's claim that pat-down searches performed by female guards violated his
First Amendment rights).
124. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1524-25. The majority refers to two Ninth Circuit cases
that suggest that prisoners' legitimate expectations of bodily privacy are extremely lim-
ited. See id at 1524. In Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 495-96 (9th Cir. 1985), the
court held that pat-down searches of male inmates that included the groin area, con-
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ment clearly protects inmates from unwarranted inflictions of pain.'25
Second, the majority employed the Eighth Amendment instead of the
Fourth Amendment because the inmates' claims focused on the pain in-
flicted by the cross-gender clothed body searches, rather than on inva-
sions of privacy. 126  Although the majority concluded that both
amendments applied, the majority did not address the Fourth Amend-
ment claim because it affirmed the district court's decision on Eighth
Amendment grounds.I27
The majority took a two-step approach in deciding the Eighth Amend-
ment claim. It considered whether the prisoner suffered "an 'infliction of
pain,' and, if so, whether that infliction was 'unnecessary and
wanton.' ,128
No single rule can determine whether an infliction of pain is unconsti-
tutional.129 Rather, a court must objectively examine the infliction in the
context of contemporary standards of decency. 130 If a prison policy of-
fends contemporary standards of decency, it violates the Eighth Amend-
ment's pain requirement. The Gardner majority looked at three
objective factors in making this decision. First, the majority noted
"[e]ighty-flve percent of the inmates report a history of serious abuse to
WCCW counselors, including rapes, molestations, beatings, and slav-
ery." '13 1 Second, several inmates' depositions and one inmate's live testi-
mony described the verbal, physical, and sexual abuse that many inmates
suffered prior to their imprisonment. 3 2 Third, a psychologist testified
that searches where a male guard touched a female inmate's breasts and
genitals "would likely leave the inmate 'revictimiz[ed],' resulting in a
number of symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder."'' 33 Because of
ducted by female guards, do not violate the Fourth Amendment. And in Michenfelder v.
Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 334 (9th Cir. 1988), the court decided that occasional visual
searches of male inmates do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The majority left the
Fourth Amendment issue open by concluding that "[t]he frequency and scope of the
searches in Grummett and Michenfelder were significantly less invasive than the searches
at issue here, and hence those cases are not controlling." Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1524.
125. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1524-25.
126. See id. at 1524. The court was referring to the fact that Michenfelder v. Sumner,
860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988) and Grummet v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985),
were claims alleging invasions of privacy, not pain and suffering.
127. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1525.
128. Id.
129. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).
130. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
131. Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1525.
132. See id. The inmate who testified at trial depicted the following abuses: rapes by
husbands, boyfriends and strangers, beatings by various men, and deprivations of food.
See id. Another testified by deposition "that her second husband beat her, strangled her,
and ran her over with a truck." Id. Another had been "frequently strapped or hand-
cuffed to a bed by her half-brother, who beat or raped her." Id. Another "was sixteen
when her uncle impregnated her; after the failure of the uncle's attempts to induce an
abortion using a broom handle, screwdriver, bleach, and Lysol, the uncle paid a man to
marry her." Id.
133. Id. at 1526.
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these objective factors, the majority agreed with the district court's con-
clusion that "[t]here is a high probability of great harm, including severe
psychological injury and emotional pain and suffering, to some inmates
from these searches, even if properly conducted." '34 Thus, the court de-
termined that the random cross-gender searches caused sufficient pain to
satisfy the Eighth Amendment's pain requirement. 35
The majority distinguished Gardner from Grummett v. Rushen,136 a
previous Ninth Circuit case that dealt with the issue of cross-gender
searches. In Grummett, male prisoners claimed that pat down searches
performed by female guards were cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment. 137 The Grummett court concluded "that
the inmates had not shown sufficient evidence of pain to make out a cog-
nizable Eighth Amendment claim."' 138 The Gardner court distinguished
Grummet by indicating that, unlike men, women are traumatized by
cross-gender searches. 139 This conclusion was supported by several wit-
nesses' trial testimony including testimony by experts in psychology and
anthropology."40
The majority opinion then examined the Eighth Amendment analysis'
second step, whether the infliction of pain was "unnecessary and wan-
ton." The court began by focusing on the "unnecessary" element.' 41
The court determined that the policy was unnecessary for two reasons.
First, because the WCCW's security was not "impaired in the slightest"
during the three years of litigation, the court decided that the WCCW's
security did not depend upon cross-gender clothed body searches.' 42 Ap-
parently, random searches performed by female guards satisfied the
prison's security needs.14 3
Second, the cross-gender clothed body search policy did not signifi-
cantly affect male guards' employment opportunities. The court found
that "not a single bid had been refused, promotion denied, nor guard
replaced as a result of the ban on routine cross-gender clothed body
searches." 1" After concluding that the infliction of pain was "unneces-
sary," the court examined whether the infliction was "wanton." The
court began its "wanton" inquiry by deciding whether it should review
the infliction of pain under the deliberate-indifference standard or the
134. L at 1525 (citation omitted).
135. See id This determination essentially satisfies the objective inquiry required by
the Supreme Court. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).
136. 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985).
137. See iL at 492-93.
138. Grummett, 779 F.2d at 493 n.l.
139. See id
140. See id These experts "discussed how the differences in gender socialization
would lead to differences in the experiences of men and women with regard to sexuality."
Id
141. See id at 1526-27.
142. See id at 1526.
143. See id. at 1527.
144. Id
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malice standard. 145 Courts apply the deliberate-indifference standard in
reviewing a prison official's conduct with respect to alleged unconstitu-
tional conditions of confinement. 46 Courts apply the malice standard
either when analyzing conduct that was undertaken in response to a
prison disturbance or when a prisoner accuses a guard of using excessive
physical force. 147
In choosing to apply the deliberate-indifference standard, the court fo-
cused on three factors. First, Superintendent Vail instituted the cross-
gender clothed body search policy only after lengthy consideration.' 4 8
Second, the court recognized that, like conditions of confinement, a
cross-gender clothed body search policy inflicts pain indefinitely. 4 9 Fi-
nally, the court noted that the officials faced no special constraints. 50
Having established the applicable standard, the court then analyzed
whether the inmates had proven that Superintendent Vail acted with de-
liberate indifference.1 5 1 In order to establish that a prison official has
acted with deliberate indifference, inmates must prove two things. First,
inmates must prove that a prison official knew or should have known
about the risk of harm to the inmates.152 Second, inmates must establish
that the prison official failed to act to prevent the harm. 53 The court
145. See id. This is the second inquiry mandated by the Supreme Court in Wilson v.
Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324-25 (1991).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 46-60.
147. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
148. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1528.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. There is currently a split among the circuit courts regarding the quantum of
knowledge possessed by a prison official necessary to satisfy the deliberate indifference
standard. Some circuit courts require the prison official to have actual knowledge of the
risk of harm. See, e.g., Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1991) (requiring
that an official have knowledge of poor prison conditions); DesRosiers v. Moran, 949
F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (requiring that deliberate indifference be shown by establishing
actual knowledge of impending harm that is easily preventable); McGill v. Duckworth,
944 F.2d 344, 349 (7th Cir. 1991) (favoring an actual knowledge requirement); Berry v.
City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1498 (10th Cir. 1990) (concluding that knowledge of
risk of harm and failure to prevent the harm constituted deliberate indifference). Other
circuit courts require that the prison official either knew of the risk of harm or should
have known of the risk of harm. See, e.g. Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 360-61 (3rd
Cir. 1992) (holding that a prison official is deliberately indifferent when he knows or
should have known of a sufficient danger to an inmate); Redman v. County of San Diego,
942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a
duty not to act with reckless indifference where a prison official knows or should know of
the danger facing the inmate).
In Farmer v. Brennan, 11 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 56 (U.S.
Oct 4, 1993) (No. 92-7247), the Supreme Court will most likely decide what quantum of
knowledge is necessary. For a discussion of the Farmer case see 54 Crim. L. Rept. 3136
(Jan. 26, 1994).
For the purposes of Gardner the distinction is irrelevant because the Superintendent
had actual knowledge of the possible harm. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1528-29.
153. See, e.g., DesRosiers, 949 F.2d at 19 (requiring failure to prevent the harm); Mc-
Gill, 944 F.2d at 348 (requiring that prison official had knowledge of danger and failed to
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found that both factors existed because the record showed that Vail's
staff had advised Vail that these searches could cause serious harm, and
that, nevertheless, he instituted the policy. 154 Having found all the ele-
ments of an Eighth Amendment violation, the court affirmed the district
court's decision."'
B. Judge Reinhardt's Concurrence
Judge Reinhardt believed that the search policy in Gardner violated
both the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. He concluded, however, that
Gardner should be decided on Fourth rather than Eighth Amendment
grounds. In his view, the Supreme Court's decision in Soldal Y. Cook
County"5 6 dictated the approach to be taken.1 57
In Soldal, the Supreme Court analyzed a claim that alleged violations
of both the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.'58 The
Court emphasized that, when faced with a question of which constitu-
tional provision to examine first, "the more 'explicit textual source of
constitutional protection'" should be considered before the "'more gen-
eralized notion.' "59
Judge Reinhardt believed that Soldal mandated a Fourth Amendment
analysis for two reasons. First, Judge Reinhardt reasoned that the con-
duct at issue was clearly a search," and "[tihe 'explicit textual source of
constitutional protection' with respect to 'searches' of 'persons' is, with-
out doubt, the fourth amendment, not the more general eighth amend-
ment."' 1  Second, a court's use of the term "search" in Fourth
Amendment analysis has a specific meaning, and thus is "explicit," '62
prevent it); Williams, 952 F.2d at 826 (same); Berry, 900 F.2d at 1498 (requiring failure
to make reasonable efforts to avert the harm).
154. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1528-29.
155. See id at 1531.
156. 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992).
157. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1540 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
158. Id
159. Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S.Ct. 538, 548 (quoting Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S.
386, 394-95 (1989)). The Supreme Court, in Soldal, unanimously reversed a Seventh
Circuit decision that espoused looking only at the "dominant character of the conduct
challenged" in determining which constitutional provision should be the basis of the anal-
ysis. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1540-41 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (quoting Soldal, 942
F.2d at 1080 (en banc)).
160. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1541 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). The majority opinion
admitted that the conduct was a search. See id. at 1524.
161. Id. at 1541 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (quoting Soldal, 113 S. Ct. at 548) (cita-
tions omitted). Judge Reinhardt also argued that Soldal requires a court "to look to the
fundamental conduct at issue before proceeding, if necessary, to more generalized charac-
terizations of the challenged behavior." Id Reinhardt challenged the majority's appli-
cation of the Eighth Amendment on the grounds that the fundamental conduct in
Gardner was the search, not the pain inflicted by the search. See id. "Pain is simply an
incident of the unreasonable searches, not, as Judge O'Scannlain would have it, '[t]he
gravamen of the inmates' charge.'" Id (quoting the majority at 1524-25).
162. See id "Insofar as searches of persons are concerned, the term applies to all such
examinations of the individual-pat-down searches, clothed body searches, visual strip
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while the term "cruel and unusual punishment" is not limited to one type
of behavior, "but applies instead to a variety of forms of unconstitutional
governmental conduct."' 16
3
Further, Judge Reinhardt argued that even if Soldal did not apply, a
court should employ a Fourth Amendment analysis for two reasons.
First, the Fourth Amendment should be applied because it is easier to
apply than the Eighth Amendment. While the Fourth Amendment re-
quires only an objective inquiry, the Eighth Amendment requires a more
complicated, subjective inquiry.'" Second, Judge Reinhardt reasoned
that it would be more efficient to apply the Fourth Amendment because
any search that violated the Eighth Amendment would be an "unreason-
able" search under the Fourth Amendment. 65 Yet, "the converse is not
true.... [A]n eighth amendment analysis may prove to be only a precur-
sor to the necessarily duplicative fourth amendment review.,' 66 For
these reasons, Judge Reinhardt concluded that the court should have de-
cided Gardner on Fourth Amendment, rather than Eighth Amendment,
grounds. 67
Next, Judge Reinhardt examined what Fourth Amendment rights a
person retains after incarceration. Reinhardt reasoned that the Fourth
Amendment, besides protecting privacy, "also protects persons against
infringements of bodily integrity, and personal dignity.... It is the pri-
vacy and dignitary interests of the female inmates that are violated
here." ' 6' Thus, Reinhardt concluded that random, cross-gender clothed
body searches implicate a prison inmate's rights of privacy and
dignity. 169
Reinhardt then addressed the prisoners' constitutional claim under the
Turner standard: whether the prison policy is reasonably related to legit-
imate penological interests.' 70 In evaluating the prisoners' claim, Judge
Reinhardt examined the four factors that the Supreme Court enumerated
in Turner.
First, there must be a rational connection between the cross-gender
searches and a legitimate governmental interest. 7 ' Reinhardt, after an-
searches, visual body cavity searches, and digital body cavity searches-no matter how
minimal or how probing they may be." Id. (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 1541-42 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). Courts have analyzed a variety of
claims under the cruel and unusual punishments clause, including but not limited to
"claims that sentences are unduly harsh or otherwise constitutionally inappropriate,
claims that inmates have been subjected to physical abuse or unlawfully denied medical
treatment." Id. at 1542 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
164. See id. at 1541 n.16, 1542 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
165. See id. at 1542. (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 1542-43 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
167. See id. at 1543 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 1534 n.7 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
169. See id. at 1534 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
170. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
171. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1536 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (quoting Turner, 482
U.S. at 89).
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alyzing prison administrators' assertions that prison security interests
and guards' equal employment rights justified these searches, concluded
that "the connection between any legitimate penological interest and
cross-gender searches is tenuous." 172
Second, the concurrence examined whether inmates have an alterna-
tive means of exercising their Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches. 173 Reinhardt recognized that an inmate, by vir-
tue of being incarcerated, cannot escape these searches."" Thus, the
cross-gender search policy left the inmates with "no means of protecting
their bodies against unreasonable searches."' 171
Third, the concurrence analyzed "'the impact that accommodation of
the asserted constitutional right will have on others (guards and inmates)
in the prison.' ,,176 Reinhardt found that "[h]ere, there will, of course, be
no adverse effect of any kind on other inmates if female guards instead of
male guards conduct the body searches."' 17
Finally, the concurrence examined whether prison authorities had an
"obvious, easy" alternative available." 8 Reinhardt found that there was
an obvious, easy alternative-use only female guards to perform these
searches. 179 Although this alternative would require administrative ad-
justments, these adjustments would be "relatively insignificant, both in
themselves and when weighed against the constitutional interests at
stake.' 180
Next, Reinhardt looked to Bell v. Wolfish for guidance on how to ap-
ply the Turner factors.' 81 Bell, which was decided before Turner, man-
dated that unreasonable search cases "require[ ] a balancing of the need
for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the
search entails."'8 2 Thus Reinhardt reasoned that the ultimate determi-
nation was "whether the prison's need to use male guards to conduct the
body searches-to the extent that such need exists--outweighs the con-
stitutional injury resulting from the invasiveness of the intrusion."' 1 3
In applying the Bell balancing test, Judge Reinhardt identified the two
interests that prison administrators advanced in support of the cross-gen-
der clothed body searches: prison security and guards' equal employ-
ment rights.' As to prison security, prison administrators argued that
172. I (emphasis omitted).
173. See id, (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 90).
174. See id. at 1536.
175. Id.
176. Id. (quoting Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 418 (1989)).
177. IM
178. See id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987)).
179. See id. at 1536-37 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 1537 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
181. See id at 1535 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
182. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
183. Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1535 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
184. See id. at 1537, 1539 (Reinhardt, ., concurring).
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suspicionless searches serve to suppress the movement of contraband
through prisons.185 They further argued that prohibiting male guards
from conducting these searches would reduce the element of unpredict-
ability that random searches brought to a prison environment. 86 Judge
Reinhardt rejected this argument because the record showed that the
three-year-long injunction did not impair security in the slightest. 87
Prison administrators also claimed that barring male guards from con-
ducting random searches would require adjustments "of staff schedules
and job responsibilities, and the overriding of the bid system in the col-
lective bargaining agreement, possibly leading to litigation by the guards'
union." '188 Judge Reinhardt noted, however, that prison authorities had
not changed a single guard's job during the three-year-long injunction. 8 9
In fact, the prison complied with the injunction simply by adjusting
guards' schedules and job assignments. 190 Further, Reinhardt explained
that previously, in resolving these situations, neither the bid system nor
the collective bargaining agreement was adversely affected. 191 In sum, he
concluded that the prison had only a minor interest in the regulation. 92
Reinhardt then analyzed the other facet of the Bell test: the invasion
of personal rights that the search entails.' 93 Judge Reinhardt agreed with
the district court's determination that an unknown number of female in-
mates would suffer great harm if the prison instituted a cross-gender
search policy.' 94 Judge Reinhardt concluded that inmates suffered sub-
stantial harm from these searches. 195
Judge Reinhardt completed his Fourth Amendment analysis by bal-
ancing the prison officials' interests against the harm inflicted on the in-
mates. 196 In balancing, Reinhardt found, that the cross-gender, clothed-
body search policy failed the Bell v. Wolfish test as applied in light of the
four Turner factors because the prison administration's interests are "sig-
nificantly outweighed by the harm the policy inflicts on the inmates and
the injury it does to their constitutional rights."'1 97
C. Judge Trott's Dissent
In dissent, Judge Trott first examined the issue of which Eighth
Amendment standard of wantonness to apply in Gardner.'98 As de-
185. See id. at 1537.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 1538 & 1534 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 1539 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 1539-1540 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
196. See id. at 1540.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 1558 (Trott, J., dissenting).
1896 [Vol. 62
JORDAN v GARDNER
scribed previously, the Supreme Court has outlined two different "wan-
ton" standards. 199 In cases in which a prison official's decision does not
conflict with competing administrative concerns, such as with conditions
of confinement, the deliberate-indifference standard applies.2" On the
other hand, in cases that involve a prison guard's use of excessive force or
where prison officials take action in response to a prison disturbance, the
malice standard applies. 201
Judge Trott, in determining whether the deliberate-indifference stan-
dard applied, found the Supreme Court's statement in Wilson v. Seiter to
be controlling.2 "2 In Wilson v. Seiter, the Supreme Court made clear that
the deliberate-indifference standard is to be used only where the "needs
of prisoners [do] not ... clash with other equally important governmen-
tal responsibilities. ' 2 3 Judge Trott concluded that Superintendent Vail
faced a considerable constraint, the welfare of the inmates.2" According
to Judge Trott, cross-gender searches protect inmates' health and safety
by eliminating weapons, drugs, and hypodermic needles from the
prison.20" Further, Vail faced a weighty constraint because he had a duty
to protect the prisoners from such dangers. 206 Thus, Judge Trott de-
clined to apply the deliberate-indifference standard.20 7
Next, Judge Trott analyzed whether to apply the malice standard. He
identified two relevant factors. First, he reasoned that the Supreme
Court had extended the malice standard to "all excessive force cases,
even where no competing institutional concerns are present., 208 Judge
Trott reasoned that "[i]t would be anomalous indeed for the law to im-
pose the highest mental element standard where gratuitous beatings oc-
cur but not where valid competing institutional concerns are
implicated." 2' To clarify his point Trott made clear that in Gardner the
cross-gender clothed body search had a valid penological purpose: to
stanch the flow of contraband within the institution.21 0
Second, Judge Trott found that the malice standard furthers "the long-
standing principle that '[p]rison administrators... should be accorded
wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and
practices."'"211 Judge Trott emphasized that judges lack the skill or
199. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 46-60.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 61-69.
202. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1559 (Trott, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (Trott, J., dissenting) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, II1 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (1991)
(quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986))).
204. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1558-59 (Trott, J., dissenting).
205. See id at 1559 (Trott, J., dissenting).
206. See id
207. See id
208. Id (quoting Hudson v. McMillian 112 S. Ct. 995, 1008 (1992).
209. Id. at 1559 (Trott, J., dissenting).
210. See id
211. Id. at 1559-60 (Trott, J., dissenting) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547
(1979)).
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knowledge required to run a corrections facility.2" 2 He noted that the
majority's opinion would create several major problems:
[T]he opinion unleashes a management nightmare.... Now, any indi-
vidual female or male prisoner previously abused sexually is immune
from random pat-down searches conducted by a person of the gender
of the prisoner's abuser. A male prisoner with a history of abuse as a
child by a man-and our prisons are full of them-will surely be able
to make a case against random pat-down searches by male correctional
officers. A woman previously abused by a woman may be able to do
the same .... What about the victimized prisoner who claims he or
she cannot have his or her private parts touched by anyone regardless
of gender without suffering psychological damage? Judge
O'Scannlain's opinion creates thereal specter of a special class of un-
touchable prisoners. 213
For these reasons Judge Trott concluded that the malice standard
applied.214
Judge Trott, in applying the malice standard, examined Superinten-
dent Vail's deliberations regarding implementation of the cross-gender
searches. Judge Trott noted that Superintendent Vail attempted to for-
mulate a cross-gender search that prisoners would find less intrusive.2 5
Further, Judge Trott explained that Superintendent Vail obviously had
struggled with this difficult problem and had tried to determine what was
best for the prison, his staff, and the inmates.2 6On this basis, Judge Trott
determined that Superintendent Vail, in implementing cross-gender
searches, had not acted maliciously or sadistically, but had acted in good
faith.21 7 Thus, Judge Trott concluded that the inmates had not proven
the "wanton" element of an Eighth Amendment claim, and therefore the
inmates' claim failed.21 8
D. Judge Wallace's Dissent
Chief Judge Wallace's dissent follows Judge Trott's dissent on all but
one point.219 Chief Judge Wallace took issue with Judge Reinhardt's
Fourth Amendment analysis, which combined the balancing test from
Bell v. Wolfish22° with the four-factor test in Turner v. Safley. 22 Chief
Judge Wallace stated that because Turner essentially overruled Bell, Tur-
212. See id. at 1560 (Trott, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 1561 (Trott, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
214. See id. at 1558 (Trott, J., dissenting)
215. See id. at 1549-52 (Trott, J., dissenting).
216. See id. at 1562 (Trott, J., dissenting).
217. See id. at 1561 (Trott, J., dissenting).
218. See id. at 1566 (Trott, J., dissenting).
219. See id. at 1567 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
220. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). See supra text accompanying note
182 for Bell test.
221. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1567 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting); see also Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987) (creating the four-factor test); text accompanying notes
76-96 (referring to Turner test).
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ner does not permit such a balancing.' m
IV. CRITICISM OF GARDNER'S EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
The Gardner majority employed the proper Eighth Amendment legal
test, in determining whether the searches in Gardner violated the Eighth
Amendment. Under an Eighth Amendment analysis, a court must con-
sider whether there is an "infliction of pain," and if so, whether that
infliction is "unnecessary and wanton.''223
A. The "Infliction of Pain" Element
Whether there is an infliction of pain requires an objective inquiry into
the severity of the pain. The Supreme Court has stated that no single,
"static" test exists by which courts can determine whether an infliction of
pain is sufficient.224 Rather, the Eighth Amendment " 'draw[s] its mean-
ing from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.' "225 The Court has made clear, however, that "only
those deprivations denying 'the minimal civilized measure of life's neces-
sities' are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment
violation.""6
The Gardner court's determination that the inmate had suffered suffi-
cient pain to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation was improper
for several reasons. First, the Gardner court's conclusion that cross-gen-
der searches violate the Eighth Amendment is contrary to the weight of
modem authority. Other circuit courts that have addressed the issue of
cross-gender searches have not concluded that these searches inflict suffi-
cient pain to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation."'
222. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1567 ('Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 1525 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (citations
omitted)).
224. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).
225. Id at 346 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
226. Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347
(citation omitted)).
227. See, e.g., Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 493 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (allowing
pat searches of male inmates by female guards); Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 955
(7th Cir.) (permitting searches of males by female guards), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996
(1983); Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 55 (7th Cir. 1982) (concluding that a pat down
search performed by a female guard on a male inmate, excluding the genital area, does
not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation).
Courts have concluded, however, that body cavity searches of members of the opposite
sex violate the Eighth Amendment. See Lee v. Downs, 470 F. Supp. 188, 193 (E.D. Va.
1979) (concluding that the forcible removal of a female inmate's clothes by male guards
constituted cruel and unusual punishment), afid, 641 F.2d 1117, 1119-20 (4th Cir. 1981)
(affirming the district court's decision, but only referring to an invasion of the prisoner's
privacy); Frazier v. Ward, 426 F. Supp. 1354, 1366 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (body cavity
searches not supported by probable cause violate the Eighth Amendment); ef Sterling v.
Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 136 (Or. 1981) (en banc) (frisking of male inmates by female prison
guards violates Oregon Constitution prohibiting prisoners from being treated with "un-
necessary rigor").
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Second, although courts must analyze claims in the context of "con-
temporary standards of decency," prisons neither are, nor are expected
to be, comfortable places even under contemporary standards. Prisoners
routinely undergo a variety of body searches, including fully clothed
body searches, visual body cavity searches, and body cavity searches.
For example, a visual body cavity search of a male requires:
opening his mouth and moving his tongue from side to side, removing
any dentures, running his hands through his hair, allowing his ears to
be visually examined, lifting his arms to expose his armpits, spreading
his testicles to expose the area behind his testicles, and bending over
and/or spreading his buttocks to expose his anus to the frisking officer.
For females the procedures are similar except that females must also
squat to expose the vagina. 228
Although these searches are deeply invasive and humiliating, courts have
found that visual cavity searches do not violate the Eighth Amend-
ment.229 Likewise, in the context of prison life, which includes many in-
vasive searches, cross-gender clothed body searches comport with
contemporary standards of decency.
Third, in considering a prison security measure's constitutionality,
courts have applied a high standard to determine what constitutes a suffi-
cient infliction of pain. Rectal searches, which can be extremely painful,
do not violate the Eighth Amendment. 230 A court also has found that a
prison guard's use of taser guns, which also are extremely painful, does
not violate the Eighth Amendment. 231 Because cross-gender searches are
no more painful and invasive than other security measures, these
searches do not meet the Eighth Amendment's pain requirements.
Finally, in cases in which courts have found an Eighth Amendment
violation, the claims are more extreme than the claims in Gardner. For
example in McCord v. Maggio,232 the Fifth Circuit found an Eighth
Amendment violation when a prisoner was forced to live and sleep for
two years in an unlit cell with backed up sewage and roaches.233 In Par-
rish v. Johnson,23 4 the Sixth Circuit found that a prison guard violated a
paraplegic inmate's Eighth Amendment rights by assaulting the inmate
with a knife, extorting food from him, and forcing the prisoner to sit in
his own feces.2 35 In Fruit v. Norris,2 36 the Eighth Circuit found an
228. Duamutef v. Leonardo, No. 91-CV-1100, 1993 WL 428509, at *12 n.1,
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1993).
229. See, e.g., Rickman v. Avaniti, 854 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding visual
body cavity searches); Arruda v. Fair, 710 F.2d 886, 888 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
999 (1983) (upholding routine visual body cavity searches of maximum security inmates).
230. See, e.g., Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 164 (7th Cir. 1988) (upholding rou-
tine probe searches).
231. See Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 334-36 (9th Cir. 1988).
232. 927 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1991).
233. See id. at 846-47.
234. 800 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1986).
235. See id. at 605.
236. 905 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1990).
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Eighth Amendment violation when prison officials compelled inmates to
work inside the prison's sewage lift-pump station without protective
clothing and equipment.237 Because the pain in these cases was more
intense and more prolonged than the pain suffered by the inmate in
Gardner, the pain in Gardner was insufficient to allege an Eighth Amend-
ment violation.
Thus, the majority in Gardner erred in determining that the inmate's
suffering constituted a sufficient infliction of pain. Further, by finding a
sufficient infliction of pain where a court should have determined that the
infliction was constitutionally insufficient, the Gardner majority lowered
the necessary threshold of pain for future claimants.
B. The Unnecessary Element
The Gardner court properly determined that the infliction of pain was
"unnecessary," because neither the WCCW's security nor its equal-em-
ployment concerns depended on cross-gender searches.2 38 Superinten-
dent Vail explained that during the three-year period in which the
district court's preliminary injunction was in effect, the WCCW's secur-
ity was not "impaired in the slightest." '239 Moreover, Vail testified that
allowing only female guards to perform random searches satisfied the
prison's need for these searches.2" As to the prison's employment con-
cerns, prison officials testified that "not a single bid had been refused,
promotion denied, nor guard replaced as a result of the ban on routine
cross-gender clothed body searches." 241
C. The "Wanton" Element
For several reasons, the majority correctly determined that the deliber-
ate-indifference standard applied in Gardner. First, because these ran-
dom searches address the medical needs of the prisoners, the deliberate-
indifference standard should apply. The Supreme Court has clearly indi-
cated that the deliberate-indifference standard applies in cases involving
medical care.242 Because the random search policy attempts to stanch
the flow of drugs and AIDS-infected syringes within the prison,243 "these
searches are designed to ameliorate a harmful condition of confinement
that is inimical to other basic human and medical needs of inmates." 2"
Second, the deliberate-indifference standard applies because these ran-
dom searches protect prisoners, and the Supreme Court has held that
237. See id. at 1150-51.
238. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1526-27 (9th Cir. 1993); see also supra text
accompanying notes 141-44.
239. Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1526.
240. See id at 1527.
241. See id.
242. See supra text accompanying note 49.
243. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1559 (Trott, J., dissenting).
244. Id (Trott, J., dissenting).
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prisoner protection is a condition of confinement.2 45 In Gardner, Super-
intendent Vail implemented random searches in order to eliminate
deadly weapons from the prison environment and thereby reduce vio-
lence between inmates and against prison staff.246
Third, the cross-gender search policy addresses a condition of confine-
ment because the constraints facing Superintendent Vail in deciding to
implement these searches are similar to the constraints that officials faced
in making decisions addressing other conditions of confinement. The
Supreme Court explained that the primary factor to examine in deter-
mining whether prison conditions are "conditions of confinement" are
the constraints officials face in making decisions.247 The Court held that
if the constraints facing an official in making any decision are similar to
those faced by an official making a decision concerning the inmates' med-
ical care, that condition should be considered a "condition of confine-
ment. 21 4  The constraints Superintendent Vail faced in implementing a
cross-gender search policy are similar to those faced by officials in deter-
mining the medical care that an inmate requires. Both officials, in mak-
ing these decisions, are constrained primarily by the size of their budgets
and work forces. Thus, because the officials face similar constraints in
both situations, the Gardner majority correctly chose to apply the delib-
erate-indifference standard.
Fourth, under the facts in Gardner, the malice standard is inappropri-
ate. The malice standard applies in two situations: when reviewing deci-
sions which involved "the use of force to restore order in the face of a
prison disturbance; 2 49 and when "prison officials stand accused of using
excessive physical force in violation of the" Eighth Amendment. '250
Clearly Gardner did not involve an action taken to quell a prison dis-
turbance, because the searches in Gardner were non-emergency
searches.25' Further, prison officials faced no prison disturbance at the
time when the guard in Gardner performed the challenged search.252 In
fact, unlike decisions made in response to a prison disturbance, the
search policy in Gardner was developed over time. 3 Superintendent
Vail considered the policy for one month before he decided to institute it,
and he delayed implementing the policy for over four months in order to
train guards to perform these searches.254
245. See Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326-27 (1991). In Wilson, the Court speci-
fied that among the conditions of confinement was "the protection [an inmate] is afforded
against other inmates." Id.
246. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1548.
247. See Wilson, 111 S. Ct. at 2326.
248. See id. at 2327.
249. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986).
250. Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 999 (1992).
251. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1531.
252. See id. at 1523.
253. See id. at 1528.
254. See id. at 1523.
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Similarly, the malice standard does not apply to searches in Gardner
because Gardner does not involve allegations of excessive physical force.
The inmates in Gardner did not claim that the force used by the male
guards violated their rights. Rather, they objected to the gender of the
person performing the search.2" Thus, because the malice standard does
not apply, the majority appropriately chose to apply the deliberate-indif-
ference standard.
The majority in Gardner properly determined that Superintendent Vail
acted with deliberate indifference. The deliberate-indifference standard
contains two elements: an element of knowledge and an element of con-
duct. The first element requires that a prison official either knew or
should have known about the risk of harm.256 The second element re-
quires a failure to act in order to prevent the harm.2 57 In Gardner, Su-
perintendent Vail knew of the risk of harm when he instituted the policy
because his staff warned him of the search's potential harm.258 Despite
these warnings, Vail implemented the policy and, hence, failed to prevent
the ensuing harm.25 9 Thus, as the Gardner court concluded, under the
deliberate-indifference standard, the cross-gender policy satisfied the
"wanton" element of an Eighth Amendment analysis.
D. Effect of the Gardner Decision
The Gardner majority correctly identified the appropriate Eighth
Amendment legal analysis. Further, it properly determined that the in-
fliction of pain suffered by the WCCW inmate was "unnecessary and
wanton." The majority's conclusion that there was a sufficient infliction
of pain, however, was incorrect. The Gardner court, by improperly find-
ing a sufficient infliction of pain, lowered the standard of pain required to
make out a constitutional violation. By creating a lower standard of pain
than courts previously have recognized, the Gardner decision broadened
the Eighth Amendment's application. This extension of the Eighth
Amendment creates several problems.
First, Gardner may provoke a flood of Eighth Amendment claims.
Male prisoners could file Eighth Amendment claims against prison poli-
cies that permit female guards to perform random clothed body
searches. 2 ° Similarly, male prisoners who have been sexually abused or
raped by men could file claims against prisons that permit male guards to
search their person randomly.26' Stretched to its utmost, Gardner could
prevent guards of a certain race or religion from searching some in-
255. See id. at 1524.
256. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
258. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1528-29.
259. See id at 1528-29.
260. For example, male inmates could present expert testimony supporting the propo-
sition that men do experience psychological trauma as a result of such searches.
261. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1561 (Trott, J., dissenting).
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mates.26 2 If an inmate claims to have been abused by a member of a
particular race or religion, the prisoner could claim to be traumatized if a
guard of that race or religion searched the prisoner.
Second, Gardner and the cases that may follow it could hamper prison
administration. Because certain guards may be prohibited from search-
ing certain inmates, prison job scheduling could become extremely com-
plicated. This "management nightmare," as Judge Trott called it, could
culminate in prisoners wearing badges that explain who may search
them.263
In addition to the problems caused by extending application of the
Eighth Amendment, the Gardner court's conclusions that male guards
may not perform random clothed body searches on female inmates but
that female guards may perform such searches on male inmates is prob-
lematic for two reasons. First, the distinction between male and female
sensitivity may become blurred as male-rape statistics become more
available and social scientists complete more thorough male-rape stud-
ies. 2" Second, Gardner and its progeny could prompt a flood of Equal
Protection claims.265 In states where courts prohibit male guards from
performing clothed body searches on female prisoners, but do not pre-
vent female guards from performing these searches on male prisoners,
male prisoners could bring Equal Protection actions. Thus, the Gardner
court may have drawn a line that it may have to reconsider in the future.
262. Groups could be based on race, religion, gender, or sexual-orientation.
263. See supra text accompanying note 213.
264. It appears that the number of male rape victims is underreported. See, e.g., Na-
than Gorenstein, Men Raping Men: It's More Common than People Think, Phila. In-
quirer, Oct. 4, 1991, at B5 (explaining that "if only 10 percent to 25 percent of female
rapes are reported, the rate for male rape is probably far lower"); Christol Powell, Male
Rape Victims: Help for an Underreported Abuse, Wash. Post, Apr. 12, 1990, at C05 (de-
tailing how a long-term study on child sexual abuse found that by 1986, 22.8 percent of
the total number of cases reported were assaults on males ages newborn to 17).
265. Two courts have addressed this issue. Although each court took a different ana-
lytical approach in resolving the prisoner claim, each arrived at the same conclusion. In
Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1990), prisoners in an all-male Nebraska state
prison brought an action alleging "that differences in privacy protections afforded male
and female inmates in the Nebraska penal system violate the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 1102-03. The court, after analyzing the claim, con-
cluded that the male inmate's claim failed because male and female inmates " 'are not
similarly situated.'" Id. at 1103 (quoting Timm v. Gunter, No. CV85-L-501, at 15-16
(D. Neb. Dec. 13, 1988)).
In Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1983), prisoners claimed that the Illi-
nois Department of Correction's policy of permitting only female guards to search female
prisoners while permitting either male or female guards to search male prisoners violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 961-62. The court
relied on the Supreme Court's statement that "any gender based distinction drawn by the
state 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.' " Id. at 962 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197(1976)). The Madyun court concluded that the claim was invalid because the state had a
legitimate objective: equal job opportunities for female guards. See id. at 962-963. Thus,
although prisoners may bring Equal Protection claims, it appears unlikely that these
claims will be successful.
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V. AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS--THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Because under a proper Eighth Amendment analysis, the prisoners'
claims in Gardner should fail, a court will have to examine the claims
under the Fourth Amendment. Unlike the Eighth Amendment, the
Fourth Amendment does provide prisoners with some protection from
intrusive cross-gender searches. A Fourth Amendment analysis also has
several advantages over an Eighth Amendment analysis. Furthermore,
by applying the Fourth Amendment, courts can avoid the problems cre-
ated by the Gardner decision.
A. The Fourth Amendment Analysis
To determine whether the prison policy in Gardner violates the Fourth
Amendment, a court must determine whether a prisoner possesses some
limited Fourth Amendment rights while incarcerated 66 and whether the
prison regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological inter-
ests.267 In performing the latter test, a court should examine four
factors.268
Although the Supreme Court has not decided whether prison inmates
have any Fourth Amendment rights,2 69 the circuit courts that have con-
sidered the matter have determined that inmates retain some limited
Fourth Amendment protection.27 0 Thus, following the weight of modern
authority, other courts should find that inmates possess some limited
Fourth Amendment rights.
In determining whether a prison policy is reasonably related to legiti-
mate penological interests, courts must first identify the governmental
interests at stake. In Gardner, two penological interests existed: the
prison's security interests and the guards' employment rights.27'
In analyzing these interests, courts should distinguish between the en-
tire random search policy and the cross-gender facet of the search policy.
Courts should draw this distinction because the prisoners in Gardner did
not claim that random searches violated their Fourth Amendment rights.
Rather, prisoners claimed that the cross-gender aspect of the search vio-
lated their Fourth Amendment rights.2 72 Thus, courts must decide
whether the cross-gender aspect of an otherwise constitutional search2 7
is reasonably related to either the prison's security interests or the
guards' employment rights.
To make this determination, courts must examine each of the four fac-
266. See supra text accompanying note 83.
267. See supra text accompanying note 80.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 91-96.
269. See supra text accompanying note 30.
270. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
271. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1537-39 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring).
272. See id at 1524.
273. See id
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tors set out in Turner. First, a court must determine whether there is a
"'valid rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legiti-
mate governmental interest." '274 Because Superintendent Vail imple-
mented these cross-gender searches as a response to a labor grievance,
there probably was a rational connection between the cross-gender ran-
dom search policy and the guard's employment rights. Before the
WCCW implemented the random, cross-gender search policy, female
guards filed a grievance against the prison's policy requiring female
guards to perform all routine searches at the prison.275 When the prison
implemented the new, random search policy, Superintendent Vail de-
cided that, in order to prevent any further labor grievances, male guards
should also perform random searches.276
To determine whether there is a rational connection between the ran-
dom cross-gender search and the prison's security interests, it is neces-
sary to ascertain whether the inmates could have taken advantage of a
situation in which only female guards performed the random searches. It
is unclear whether the search policy was rationally connected to the
prison's security interests because the evidence regarding the policy's af-
fect on prison security is contradictory.
On direct examination, Superintendent Vail testified that having only
female officers searching the prisoners was analogous to " 'putting a red
flag on half the officers . . . . Those with red flags can search; those
without can't.' ,277 Yet, on cross examination, Superintendent Vail ad-
mitted that inmates would not ordinarily know the sex of the guards at
any location in the prison, and therefore, the inmates could not anticipate
where and when to move any contraband. 78 While Vail's testimony on
direct examination seems to establish a rational connection between the
search policy and a security interest, his testimony on cross-examination
considerably undermines this connection.
The second Turner factor requires a court to examine whether inmates
have an "alternative means of exercising the [constitutional] right. 2 79
Here, inmates claim a right to be free from cross-gender searches, and
due to the nature of incarceration, they cannot avoid these searches.
Thus, inmates have no other means of exercising their right to be free
from such searches. Therefore, the second element indicates that these
searches may be unconstitutional.
Third, a court must consider "the impact [that] accommodation of the
asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and
on the allocation of prison resources generally."280 Accommodating the
274. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S.
576, 586 (1984)).
275. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1523.
276. See id. at 1523.
277. Id. at 1554 (Trott, J., dissenting) (quoting testimony of Superintendent Vail).
278. See id. at 1538 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
279. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
280. Id.
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inmates' rights in Gardner would have little impact on the allocation of
prison resources. Prohibiting male guards from performing random
searches resulted in only slight changes in the guards' work schedules.281
Further, prohibiting male guards from performing these searches did not
significantly affect the guards' employment rights.282 The three-year-
long injunction, which prohibited male guards from performing these
searches, did not significantly affect the male guards' wages and promo-
tions. 2 3 Thus, prohibiting these cross-gender searches would have no
appreciable effect on guards and inmates.
Fourth, a court must determine whether an "obvious, easy" alternative
to the challenged practice exists that will fully accommodate the pris-
oner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.2  Here,
there is an "obvious, easy" alternative-use female guards to perform all
random cross-gender searches. This alternative is obvious and easy be-
cause requiring female guards to perform all random, cross-gender
searches will not jeopardize any of the prison's security interests. 285 In
fact, superintendent Vail confirmed that random searches performed
only by female guards satisfied the WCCW's need for random
searches.2
86
Further, this alternative will not affect the guard's equal-employment
rights because prison officials did not replace a single guard or deny a
single promotion during the three years that the injunction was in
place.287 Superintendent Vail acknowledged that he made only slight ad-
justments to scheduling and job assignments during this three-year pe-
riod when only female guards were permitted to perform random
searches.288 Because there is an "obvious, easy" alternative in this case,
the regulation is not reasonable but is rather an exaggerated response to
prison concerns.289 In light of these four factors, the WCCW's policy is
not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest and, thus, vio-
lates the inmates' Fourth Amendment rights.
B. Considerations Supporting a Fourth Amendment Approach
A court performing a Fourth Amendment analysis of cross-gender
prison search claims gains certain advantages over a court performing an
Eighth Amendment analysis. First, performing a Fourth Amendment
analysis when addressing prison search claims is the most efficient dispo-
281. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1539 (Reinhardt, J. concurring).
282. See id.
283. See iL at 1539 n.13 (Reinhardt, J., concurring), 1527.
284. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1987).
285. Prison officials testified at trial that security at the WCCW had not been impaired
in the slightest during the three year period that injunctions prohibited random, cross-
gender searches. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1526-27.
286. See id. at 1526-27.
287. See id. at 1526-27, 1539 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
288. See id. at 1539 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
289. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1987).
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sition of the claim. Because any search which constitutes cruel and unu-
sual punishment under the Eighth Amendment should be considered
"unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, any search violating the
Eighth Amendment will also violate the Fourth Amendment. z90 The
converse, however, is not true.2 9' Thus, by considering the Fourth
Amendment first, a court will be performing its analysis more efficiently.
Second, a Fourth Amendment analysis has the advantage of simplic-
ity. The Fourth Amendment analysis is relatively straightforward, re-
quiring only an objective determination of whether the search is
"unreasonable. 2 9 2 In contrast, an Eighth Amendment analysis requires
a court to conduct a subjective inquiry into a prison official's state of
mind, 93 in addition to other "complex issues posed by an exploration of
eighth amendment doctrine., 294
Furthermore, a court finding a Fourth Amendment violation will
avoid the considerable problems that the Gardner court created when it
found an Eighth Amendment violation. First, unlike Gardner, a court
finding a Fourth Amendment violation will not provoke a flood of pris-
oner claims. Under the Fourth Amendment, a prison official must only
prove that the search regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest in order to defeat a prisoner's Fourth Amendment al-
legation.2 95 Thus, a prisoner is burdened with a far more difficult task
under the Fourth Amendment than under the Eighth Amendment as
defined by the Gardner court. Because this heavier burden will discour-
age many prisoners from filing claims, applying a Fourth Amendment
approach avoids the flood of litigation that the Gardner decision will
create.
Second, because under the Fourth Amendment courts will find fewer
violations, prison administrators will face fewer court-imposed search re-
strictions. Further, those search restrictions that courts impose will
likely be easy to implement because a significant factor in determining
whether a Fourth Amendment violation exists is an alternative's effect on
prison resources. Thus, courts will avoid the managerial nightmare that
Judge Trott envisioned.
Finally, by finding a Fourth Amendment violation a court avoids cre-
ating a problematic distinction between men and women's sensitivity.
The Gardner court concluded that male guards may not perform random
290. See Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1542 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J. con-
curring). This argument is correct when comparing an Eighth Amendment analysis with
the proper standard of care and a Fourth Amendment analysis. However, under the
Gardner court's improper Eighth Amendment analysis with a lower standard of pain, this
statement is incorrect because the Eighth Amendment analysis becomes almost
ineffectual.
291. See Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1542 (Reinhardt, J. concurring).
292. See id.
293. See supra text accompanying note 42.
294. Gardner, 986 F.2d at 1542.
295. See supra text accompanying note 80.
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clothed body searches on female inmates but that female guards may
perform such searches on male inmates. In contrast, a Fourth Amend-
ment finding does not create a bright-line gender distinction. Rather, it
ascertains on a case-by-case basis whether the prison regulation is reason-
ably related to legitimate penological interests. Thus, because a Fourth
Amendment analysis does not distinguish between men and women's
sensitivity, it does not create a distinction which may have to be recon-
sidered in the future.
C. Criticism of Judge Reinhardt's Fourth Amendment Analysis
Although arriving at the same conclusion, this Fourth Amendment
analysis should not be misconstrued as a tacit acceptance of Judge Rein-
hardt's Fourth Amendment analysis.296 As Chief Judge Wallace's dis-
sent observed,297 Judge Reinhardt's Fourth Amendment analysis is
flawed in both its explanation and application of the appropriate Fourth
Amendment law.
Although Reinhardt correctly set forth the Turner test and its four
factors,298 he stated that a court should look to Bell v. Wolfish for gui-
dance in applying Turner.299 Reinhardt's employment of the Bell stan-
dard is improper. The Supreme Court decided Turner after Bell3" and
effectively prohibited courts from applying the Bell test in prison
cases.3°" Bell mandates that a court employ a balancing test when ana-
lyzing unreasonable search claims.30 2 Turner, on the other hand, applies
whenever "a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional
rights."3 3 Therefore, because Turner was decided after Bell and the
Supreme Court has made clear that Turner must be applied when prison-
ers bring any constitutional claim, the Bell v. Wolfish balancing test does
not survive Turner in the prison context.
Thus, when Judge Reinhardt applied the four Turner factors, he em-
ployed an improper balancing approach.3" Turner does not authorize
such balancing. Rather, it requires a court to examine four factors to
determine whether a regulation is reasonably related to legitimate peno-
logical interests.30 ' Thus, Judge Reinhardt, while arriving at the correct
conclusion, performed an improper Fourth Amendment analysis.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 156-97.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 219-22.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 170-80.
299. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
300. The Turner case was decided in 1987, over eight years after the Bell case was
decided.
301. See Turner v. Safley 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
302. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
303. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 181-97.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 76-96.
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CONCLUSION
The Gardner court addressed a prison search policy that implicated
the Fourth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment. Although courts
typically address prison search issues under the Fourth Amendment, the
majority in Gardner concluded that the random, cross-gender clothed
body searches at issue in that case violated the Eighth Amendment. It
reached this conclusion by incorrectly finding that the prison policy in-
flicted sufficient pain on one inmate to constitute an Eighth Amendment
violation. Had the court analyzed the pain element properly, it would
have found that the infliction of pain the inmate suffered was insufficient
to violate the Eighth Amendment.
The Gardner court's improper conclusion is problematic because it
lowers the required threshold of pain necessary for an Eighth Amend-
ment violation. This lowered standard could provoke a flood of Eighth
Amendment claims and could create administrative problems within
prisons. Moreover, the Gardner court's analysis is based in part on a
gender-specific distinction in evaluating the amount of pain inflicted,
and, as such is troublesome.
Courts should not follow the Gardner decision. Rather, courts should
analyze prison searches under the Fourth Amendment. Under a Fourth
Amendment analysis, the WCCW's random, cross-gender searches vio-
lated the prisoners' rights to be free from unreasonable searches. More-
over, a Fourth Amendment analysis affords courts an efficient and simple
analytical framework for resolving these prison search claims. Thus, a
Fourth Amendment analysis provides prisoners some protection from in-
vasive cross-gender searches while avoiding the considerable problems
the Gardner court created when it found an Eighth Amendment
violation.
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